

MAY 7 1965

Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP75-00149R000100540010-4

MAGAZINES

Hawk v. Dove

The hawks and the doves have been arguing their respective viewpoints on Viet Nam for some time now, but seldom before have they so clearly articulated the points on which they differ. In last week's *New Republic*, Political Scientist Hans J. Morgenthau contends that escalation is dooming the



MORGENTHAU



BRZEZINSKI

In an inexact science, irreconcilable views.

U.S. to an all-out war. In a recent *New Leader*, Political Scientist Zbigniew Brzezinski maintains that escalation is just what is needed to end the war.

Back to the Monolith. The bombing of North Viet Nam, writes Morgenthau, has thrown the Soviet Union into "despair, alarm and exasperation, most keenly felt by those identified with a policy of peaceful coexistence with the U.S. They declare themselves to be fighting with their backs to the wall, barely holding their own against the growing influence of the faction that favors the hard line of the Chinese."

The Soviet Union cannot be expected to sit back and accept the destruction of North Viet Nam, Morgenthau argues. "Every target hit weakens not the resolution of Hanoi to unify Viet Nam under its auspices but the resolution of the Soviet Union to stay out of the conflict. It cannot afford to remain indefinitely passive; for to do so would be tantamount to admitting that it cannot protect a small Communist nation against American military power."

Moreover, Russia is now presented with the perfect opportunity to prove that it is still boss in the Communist world. "While China only speaks loudly but can do very little, it is the Soviet Union who in actuality carries the big stick and is willing to use it on behalf of another Communist nation. In the end, the monolithic character of the Communist camp would be restored under the auspices of the Soviet Union. We are moving closer to that military confrontation which nobody wants but which nobody knows how to avoid."

No Paper Tiger. "The Cuban missile crisis, for example, was a basic lesson in international politics. The U.S. assured the Soviets that it will

react if pushed too hard—that there is legitimate merit in maintaining international stability." When the U.S. hesitated to act in Viet Nam, the Soviets forgot the lesson and thought the Chinese correct in labeling the U.S. a paper tiger. "It was in this context that the Soviet leadership began to show renewed interest in North Viet Nam."

By bombing North Viet Nam and "reassuring the Soviet Union that it was right in its original analysis, the U.S. is contributing to the maintenance of the Soviet-American *détente* and preventing the Soviet regime from emulating the Chinese. It can even be argued that the present American offensive action against North Viet Nam constitutes a form of preliminary negotiation.

"Major Soviet intervention seems dubious," continues Brzezinski; "symbolic gestures, involving military aid and 'volunteers' are more likely." By assisting the North Vietnamese, Russia would be getting involved in a theater in which the Soviets have no effective military establishment and would therefore be dependent on Chinese good will for their logistical and strategic support. The ultimate beneficiaries would be the Chinese. There is little reason to believe that such magnanimity and philanthropy will characterize Soviet foreign policy."

CPYRGHT

CPYRGHT

Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP75-00149R000100540010-4